Modified Best Interest Standard: How States against Same-Sex Unions Should Adjudicate Child Custody and Visitations Disputes between Same-Sex Couples by Battaglioli, Leah C.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 4 Summer 2005 Article 10 
2005 
Modified Best Interest Standard: How States against Same-Sex 
Unions Should Adjudicate Child Custody and Visitations Disputes 
between Same-Sex Couples 
Leah C. Battaglioli 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Leah C. Battaglioli, Modified Best Interest Standard: How States against Same-Sex Unions Should 
Adjudicate Child Custody and Visitations Disputes between Same-Sex Couples, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1235 
(2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol54/iss4/10 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
MODIFIED BEST INTEREST STANDARD: HOW
STATES AGAINST SAME-SEX UNIONS SHOULD
ADJUDICATE CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DISPUTES BETWEEN SAME-SEX COUPLES
Leah C. Battaglioli+
Elizabeth and Kate, residents of New York, began a relationship in
1999.1 In 2001, the couple was joined in a civil union in Vermont.
Shortly thereafter, the couple decided to adopt a little girl from China.
However, because China does not allow same-sex couples to adopt,2 only
Elizabeth officially adopted the child, whom they called June. Both
Elizabeth and Kate were involved in the daily care and upbringing of
June. Elizabeth and Kate discussed Kate's option to adopt June in a
second-parent adoption.3 However, their relationship soured in 2003 and
Elizabeth took June and moved to Florida.4 Elizabeth permitted Kate to
see June frequently until it proved inconvenient. Elizabeth eventually
filed a motion in the Florida court system to determine parentage of June
and prevent Kate from seeking custody or visitation rights. How will the
Florida court decide the case?
The number of same-sex parents in the United States is increasing.'
An estimated six to ten million individuals in same-sex relationships are
' J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Helen Alvar6 for her advice and guidance
throughout the writing process as well as Mr. Joseph Price, Esq., for providing court
documents from the Miller-Jenkins case. In addition, the author would like to thank the
editors and staff of the Catholic University Law Review, in particular Greg Jacobs, for
their hard work in editing this Comment. Finally, the author would like to thank her
parents for their constant love, support, and encouragement.
1. This paragraph contains a fictional fact pattern to illustrate how same-sex couples
are sometimes faced with child custody or visitation disputes. The author used New York
residents because New York has yet to adopt a statute specifically refusing to recognize
same-sex unions and has allowed same-sex couples to adopt children. See In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995). But see infra note 94.
2. E.g., ADOPTION MEDIA, LLC, CHINA ADOPTION, http://china.adoption.com (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005).
3. See Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398 (allowing second-parent adoption in New York).
4. Florida outlaws same-sex unions, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2005), and
adoption by same-sex couples, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West Supp. 2004).
5. See, e.g., Margaret S. Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions To Adjudicate
Parentage for Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 365-66 (2004).
1235
Catholic University Law Review
6parents of between six and fourteen million children. An estimated 1.2
to three million of these individuals live together as couples.7 Over 7000
same-sex couples were joined in civil unions in Vermont and many
thousands more were married in Massachusetts.8 In addition, these
couples can enter into recognized unions in Hawaii, California, or New
Jersey.9 With the large number of same-sex couples becoming parents,
the hypothetical child custody and visitation dispute previously described
is becoming more common.0 However, at the same time that some states
are beginning to recognize same-sex unions, the vast majority of states
are passing laws against them, as allowed by Congress' passage of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)." As a result, states are inconsistent
in their treatment of child custody and visitation disputes between same-
sex couples. 2 Specifically, the law is unsettled on how states that do not
recognize same-sex unions will adjudicate child custody and visitation
disputes arising after a couple has dissolved a same-sex union formed in
another state.
This Comment argues that states refusing to recognize same-sex
unions should use a modified best interest standard with a mandatory
psychological parent determination to adjudicate child custody and
visitation disputes between same-sex couples whose union has dissolved.
To demonstrate the inadequacy of current standards, this Comment
analyzes Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,3 a case involving a child
custody and visitation dispute between a same-sex couple whose civil
union recently dissolved.1 4 This Comment provides an overview of the
importance of parental status in seeking child custody or visitation. Next,
6. Id. at 365; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990).
7. See Marcus C. Tye, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Parents: Special
Considerations for the Custody and Adoption Evaluator, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 92, 92 (2003).
& See Jonathan Finer, Custody Case Puts Civil Union On Trial: States' Differing
Laws Complicate Same-Sex Couple's Fight Over Child, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2004, at A3.
9. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4
(Michie 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-6(a) (West Supp. 2005).
10. See Osborne, supra note 5, at 365-66.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); see infra Part I.D.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. filed Nov. 24, 2003); No.
CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed July 1, 2004).
14. See S. Mitra Kalita, Vt. Same-Sex Unions Null in Va., Judge Rules, WASH. POST,
Aug. 25, 2004, at B1. The case is currently proceeding simultaneously in the Rutland
County Family Court in Vermont and the Frederick County Circuit Court in Virginia. Id.
This case is the first case in the Virginia court system to test Virginia's new Marriage
Affirmation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (Michie 2004); Kalita, supra, which refuses to
recognize same-sex unions from other states, § 20-45.3.
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this Comment discusses how same-sex couples can have children and the
corresponding parental rights. This Comment also describes the
available same-sex union alternatives and addresses the public policies of
states against such unions. This Comment then analyzes the "best
interest of the child" standard and, lastly, discusses the standards courts
and states can or have used to address child custody and visitation
disputes between former same-sex couples, and a synopsis of their
advantages and disadvantages.
I. SAME-SEX COUPLE PARENTING: RIGHTS, TYPES AND LIMITS
A. Rights Afforded to Parents
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that parents
have a fundamental liberty interest "in the care, custody, and control of
their children" that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Traditionally, so long as a biological parent is
"fit" and thus capable of caring for a child, states do not interfere in
parental decision-making." Marriage of the child's biological mother and
father is not required for both parents to assert and maintain their
presumptive right to raise their child without state interference.
17
Although the Court holds that parents have a fundamental liberty
interest to raise children as they see fit, the right is not absolute. 8 The
15. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing that parents have a constitutionally protected
right "in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) ("[T]he relationship between parent and child is constitutionally
protected."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("[The] primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."). This interest is so rooted in our judicial system that it has
been classified as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
[the Supreme] Court." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion). The rationale
underlying this parental control is that "historically it has [been] recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (plurality opinion); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 304 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646-47, 649 (1972) (holding that
although the father had never married the mother of his children, they had lived together
as a family and it was a violation of the father's due process rights to take the children
away from him upon the mother's death without a showing that he was an unfit parent).
18. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 87-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf, Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("[A] deeply loving and
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Court has previously stated that "a parent's liberty interests 'do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child[;] [t]hey require relationships more enduring."'1 9 Multiple Supreme
Court cases have applied this rationale in adjudicating child custody and
visitation disputes. °
In addition, at least two members of the Supreme Court have
suggested that a child who has established a psychological bond with a
third party has a liberty interest in preserving that relationship over an
21 2
objection of the biological parents. In Troxel v. Granville,22 Justice
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even
in the absence of blood relationship.").
19. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 260 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979))). Although
the view that biology alone is not enough to warrant constitutional protection of the
parent-child relationship was expressed in a dissenting opinion, a majority of the Court
endorsed the view in Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. at 259-61. In Lehr, the Court elaborated
on what an "enduring relationship" warranting constitutional protection would entail. Id.
at 261-62. Specifically, the Court stated that biology allows the "opportunity" to establish
a relationship with the child, but the parent must invest effort into the child's future by
taking on parental responsibilities, such as helping raise the child, in order for the
relationship to reach a level warranting constitutional protection. See id. In addition,
some state courts have also explicitly endorsed this view. See, e.g., State v. Wooden, 57
P.3d 583, 588-89 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Wis.
2004). Justice Stevens has stated that the Court views a parent's rights as "limited by the
existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child . . . tied to the presence or
absence of some embodiment of family." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 844 (expressing that "the importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in
'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children" (alteration in original)
(quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-33)).
20. See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. In Quilloin, the Court held that because the
natural father had never attempted to legitimize the child and had never taken on any
significant responsibility for the child, it was in the child's best interest to be adopted by
the mother's new husband. Id.; see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261. The court in Lehr
specifically stated:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child," his
interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a father
toward his children." But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7, 392).
21. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Although a majority of the Court has not decided that children have a liberty interest in
preserving a relationship with a third person with whom the child has formed a
psychological bond, commentators have argued that the Troxel decision has not foreclosed
this option. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best.
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 882
(2003); Brooke N. Silverthorn, Note, When Parental Rights and Children's Best Interests
1238
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Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion that children also have "liberty
interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds."23 In a
separate dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that because
family dynamics are changing, many cases will arise "in which a third
party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has
developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to
absolute parental veto., 24 Various state courts have granted visitation
25rights to such individuals.
B. Ways in Which Same-Sex Couples Can Have Children
1. Artificial Insemination
The majority of lesbian couples seeking to conceive utilize artificial
26insemination to have children. During this process, sperm from either a
known or unknown donor is injected into the uterus of the woman and if
the injected sperm fertilizes one of the eggs, the woman carries the child
27to term. As a result, the biological mother is automatically givenparental status through her biological connection with the child, whereas
Collide: An Examination ofTroxel v. Granville As It Relates To Gay and Lesbian Families,
19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 909-10 (2003). But see Jennifer Kovalcik, Note, Troxel v.
Granville: In the Battle Between Grandparent Visitation Statutes and Parental Rights, "The
Best Interest of the Child" Standard Needs Reform, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 803, 819 (2002).
22. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
23. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Stevens stated:
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child's
liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds, it seems
to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental
liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children
have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy specifically states that "a fit
parent's right vis-A-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-A-vis another parent
or a de facto parent may be another." Id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 516 (Ct. App. 1992) (allowing third
party, whose relationship with the child rose to the level of a de facto parent, visitation
rights to the child); Francis v. Francis, 654 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (granting ex-
husband visitation with ex-wife's children fathered by another man during an extra-marital
affair because ex-husband had treated the children as his own, and it was in the best
interest of the children to maintain a relationship with the man they had always considered
to be their father); Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 637-38, 642 (Wis. 2004)
(holding that former husband who raised and supported child was the child's father and
denied the putative father from asserting any rights to the child because he had taken no
steps to develop a relationship with the child).
26. See Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a
Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 2 (1999) (arguing that artificial insemination is the
easiest and least expensive way to become pregnant).
27. Id.
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her partner's parental status must arise through other means, such as
28adoption or by statute.
2. Surrogacy
Other same-sex couples seeking to have children, particularly gay
males, often choose surrogacy." Such a couple would use sperm from
one member of the couple to either fertilize an anonymously donated egg
and implant that egg into another woman who gestates the child, or
fertilize the egg of the surrogate who will also gestate the child °.3  The
sperm donor would automatically receive parental status as the biological
father, whereas his partner would have to gain parental recognition by
other means."
3. Adoption
Both male and female same-sex couples utilize national or
international adoption.32 States vary widely in their views on whether gay
and lesbian individuals or couples should be allowed to adopt.33 Three
states, Florida, Mississippi, and Utah, currently ban all forms of same-sex
28. Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family
Values By a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1759 (1998)
[hereinafter Christensen, Simulacrum of Marriage]. If an unknown donor is used, the
donor typically does not seek any parental rights and thus usually waives them through a
signed agreement or by statute. Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental
Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1227, 1259 (1994). If a known donor is
used, such a waiver must also be given or the known donor may later be able to assert
parental rights through his status as the biological father. Laurie A. Rompala, Note,
Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests of the Child: Why Illinois Courts Must Recognize
Same-Sex Parents Seeking Visitation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1933, 1938-39 (2001).
However, in some cases, the agreements signed by known donors are deemed irrelevant,
especially when the biological mother has allowed the known donor to have some contact
with the child. Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay
and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1356 (1997) [hereinafter Christensen,
Legal Ordering of Family Values].
29. See Doskow, supra note 26, at 3.
30. Christensen, Simulacrum of Marriage, supra note 28, at 1760-61.
31. Id. at 1763. This scheme is risky; even if all intended parties signed a surrogacy
agreement in which the woman carrying the child to term agrees to relinquish any parental
rights to the child, the woman can still assert a claim to being the biological mother to the
child in spite of the agreement. Rompala, supra note 28, at 1940.
32. Doskow, supra note 26, at 3-4. Generally, when people want to adopt, a petition
must be filed with the state court, which evaluates whether or not the individual or couple
is fit to adopt. Molly Cooper, Note, What Makes a Family? Addressing the Issue of Gay
and Lesbian Adoption, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 178, 180 (2004). Most courts will apply the best
interest of the child standard. Id.; see also Christensen, Simulacrum of Marriage, supra
note 28, at 1764.
33. Karla J. Starr, Note, Adoption By Homosexuals: A Look At Differing State Court
Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1998).
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adoption. Other states recognize, or at least do not prohibit, same-sex
adoption either through legislation or case law.3" Some of these same
states also allow second-parent adoption, which occurs when the non-
adoptive, non-biological partner adopts his or her partner's child.36
C. Sanctioned Same-Sex Unions and Corresponding "Parental" Rights
Many same-sex couples desire to solidify their commitment to each
other by entering into a recognized same-sex union.37 Currently, same-
sex couples have the option of entering into a civil union in Vermont, a
reciprocal beneficiary relationship in Hawaii, a domestic partnership in
California and New Jersey, or marriage in Massachusetts. 38 The parental
rights associated with these unions are either defined in the statutes
creating the same-sex unions or in preexisting statutes.
1. Civil Union: Vermont
In Baker v. State,4° the Supreme Court of Vermont responded to a
challenge of the state's marriage laws brought by three same-sex couples
that were denied marriage licenses. 41 The court held that "the State is
constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.,
42
However, the court left it up to the legislature to decide what form this
extension of protection would take. 43
On July 1, 2000, Vermont became the first state to recognize the legal
status of a "civil union" reserved exclusively for same-sex couples.
44
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (Supp.
2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002).
35. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8600-01 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-43
(West 2002); In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1186 (Del. Fain. Ct. 2001); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d
837, 840 (D.C. 1995); In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 315-16 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202-03 (Pa. 2002).
36. See, e.g., Hart, 806 A.2d at 1185-86; Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 315-16; In re Adoption
of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Jacob, 660
N.E.2d at 398; see also Cooper, supra note 32, at 182.
37. See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social
Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 308 (discussing how
homosexuals are "seeking recognition" of their same-sex relationships and "legal
protections" for their newly created families).
38. See infra Part I.C.l-4.
39. See infra Part I.C.1-4.
40. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
41. Id. at 867.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202-02 (2002); Pamela Ferdinand, Same-Sex Couples
Take Vows As Law Takes Effect: Across Vermont, Dozens Celebrate Civil Unions, WASH.
2005]
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Under the Civil Union Act, same-sex couples are afforded all of the legal
protections and benefits that flow from the status of marriage. 4  The
Civil Union Act also deals with child custody by incorporating the
46Presumption of Parentage statute into the Act. The statute, as
incorporated, states:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the
civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple, with
respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural• 41
parent during the marriage.
The language of the statute implies that if a same-sex couple enters into a
civil union and one partner either adopts a child, has a child through
artificial insemination, or donates sperm to a surrogate, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the non-biological, non-adoptive partner is a
"parent" worthy of visitation or custodial rights if the union dissolves.48
This interpretation is being tested in the Miller-Jenkins case.49 In Miller-
Jenkins, the Vermont court held that under Vermont law, both parties to
a civil union have a parental interest in a child conceived through
artificial insemination that they intended to raise together. ° However,
this decision may or may not stand depending on whether Vermont or
Virginia ultimately retains jurisdiction.
POST, July 2, 2000, at A3. On April 13, 2005, Connecticut's House of Representatives
passed a bill that would create the status of civil unions in Connecticut. Jonathan Finer,
Connecticut House Votes To Allow Gay Unions, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2005, at Al. The
state senate is expected to support the house version and, if it does, the Governor of
Connecticut, M. Jodi Rell (R), has indicated that she will sign it. Id.
45. tit. 15, § 1204. Specifically, the Civil Union Act extends to same-sex couples "the
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from
statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law,
as are granted to spouses in marriage." Id. § 1204(a).
46. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (Supp. 1998); see also Jill Jourdan, The Effects of
Civil Unions on Vermont Children, VT. B.J., Mar. 2002, at 32, 32-33.
47. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002).
48. See id.; see also Jourdan, supra note 46, at 34.
49. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct.
Nov. 17, 2004) (order recognizing parental interest in both parties). Prior to Miller-
Jenkins, this interpretation had yet to be tested in the Vermont courts. Jourdan, supra
note 46, at 34. This provision would clearly control if the couple remained in Vermont.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002). However, many individuals who enter civil
unions come from other states and do not remain in Vermont. See infra note 94 and
accompanying text. In light of the fact that the majority of these other states have refused
to recognize any type of same-sex union or the rights flowing from them, this provision
would probably not control in those situations. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
50. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03, at 11, 13 (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. Nov. 17,
2004) (order recognizing parental interest in both parties).
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2. Reciprocal Beneficiary: Hawaii
Hawaii has developed the legal status of "reciprocal beneficiary,"
available to any two people who have consented and signed a declaration
to that effect."1 The reciprocal beneficiary status affords couples many of
the same benefits as marriage, but not all. 2 Although the status is not
limited to same-sex couples, it was created in response to a challenge to
the state's marriage laws by same-sex couples. 3 In Baehr v. Lewin,54 the
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that excluding marriage licenses to same-
sex couples violated the state constitution's equal protection clause.5 In
response to the court's decision, the Hawaii legislature passed a state
constitutional amendment allowing the legislature to limit marriage to
heterosexual couples.56 However, the state legislature concurrently
established the status of reciprocal beneficiaries.
Regarding child custody and visitation rights, Hawaii made no special
provisions in the reciprocal beneficiary statute and, therefore, preexisting
51. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie 1999).
52. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 247-3 (Michie Supp. 2004) (granting tax
exemptions); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323-2 (Michie 2004) (granting privilege of hospital
visitation and extension of authority to make health care related decisions) id. § 431:10-
234 (granting right to receive benefit of partner's life insurance policy); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 509-2 (Michie 2000) (granting right to create tenancies in common, tenancies by
the entirety, or joint tenancies).
53. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-3 to 572C-4 (Michie 1999); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
54. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
55. Id. at 67. The equal protection clause in Hawaii's state constitution is more
expansive than the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution. Compare
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No person shall.., be denied the equal protection of the laws,
nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry." (emphasis added)), with U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that a state cannot "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). Based on the plain language of the text of
Hawaii's equal protection clause, it is more expansive than the United States Constitution
by specifically prohibiting "state-sanctioned discrimination against any person in the
exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis of sex." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60. As such,
because the Hawaii statute at issue in Baehr denied same-sex couples the rights and
benefits flowing from the marital status solely because the couples were of the same-sex,
the statute on its face, and as applied, created a sex-based classification. Id. at 64. The
court subsequently determined that a sex-based classification is a "suspect classification"
under an equal protection analysis requiring the state to pass the strict scrutiny test. Id. at
67. However, the court refused to hold that same-sex couples had a fundamental right to
marry. Id. at 57.
56. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
57. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to 572C-7 (Michie 1999); see also HARRY D.
KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW 59 (5th ed. 2003).
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statutes apply.5 The preexisting child custody and visitation statutes give
preference to either one or both biological parents depending on the best
interest of the child.59 However, these statutes also give courts discretion
to award third parties, which could include a non-adoptive, non-
biological same-sex partner, custody rights or "reasonable visitation"
rights provided that the best interest of the child is served.
6
0
3. Domestic Partnership: California and New Jersey
California has created the status of "domestic partnership" for any two
adults who choose to live in an "intimate and committed" relationship.61
Previously, domestic partners received many of the same rights as
married couples, but not all. 62 However, as of January 1, 2005, the rights
of domestic partners were extended to include all of the benefits afforded
married couples.63
58. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie Supp. 2004). The statute states that
it applies to "actions for divorce, separation, annulment, separate maintenance, or any
other proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the custody of a minor child." Id.
The language "any other proceeding" could easily cover dissolution of reciprocal
beneficiary relationships. See id.
59. See id. § 571-46(1). The statute does not explicitly define "parent," but the
subsequent provision in the statute implies that "parent" refers to the biological mother
and father of the child. Id. § 571-46(2) (stating that custody can be awarded to "persons
other than the father or mother").
60. See id. §§ 571-46(2), (7). As it pertains to child custody, the statute specifically
states that "[c]ustody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother
whenever the award serves the best interest of the child." Id. § 571-46(2). As it pertains
to visitation rights, the statute specifically states that "[r]easonable visitation rights shall be
awarded to parents, grandparents, siblings, and any person interested in the welfare of the
child in the discretion of the court, unless it is shown that rights of visitation are detrimental
to the best interests of the child." Id. § 571-46(7) (emphasis added). Since the focus of the
statute is on the best interest of the child and there is no specific exclusion of a non-
adoptive, non-biological same-sex partner as an individual who can seek child custody and
visitation rights, the non-adoptive, non-biological partner should be able to seek rights to a
child of the reciprocal beneficiary union. See id. §§ 571-46(2), (7). Currently, no Hawaii
court decision has tested whether the statute permits courts to award child custody or
visitation to a same-sex partner if it is in the child's best interest.
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2004).
62. Joshua K. Baker, Status, Benefits, and Recognition: Current Controversies in the
Marriage Debate, 18 BYU J. PUB. L 569, 599 (2004). The rights previously granted
domestic partners included hospital visitation, health insurance coverage, family and
medical leave, standing to bring a wrongful death suit, inheritance rights, and eligibility for
second-parent adoption. Id.
63. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004). Specifically, the statute states that
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties
under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court
rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of
law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.
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Like the Vermont Civil Union Act, California's amended domestic
partnership law includes a provision relating to child custody, which
specifically states that "[t]he rights and obligations of registered domestic
partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as
those of spouses."'4 The amended law also includes a provision requiring
California to recognize as a domestic partnership any out-of-state, same-
sex union that is equivalent to a domestic partnership in California.65
In early 2004, New Jersey also created the status of "domestic
partnership., 6   Like California's law, the status is not reserved
exclusively for same-sex couples, but unlike California's law, it is not
nearly as expansive, granting only those rights which are specified in the
Act. 6' Regarding child custody and visitation, the domestic partnership
Id. The language of this provision is virtually identical to the wording in the Vermont
Civil Union Act, implying that these two systems are legal equivalents. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002).
64. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2004). The language is not as clear as the
equivalent provision in Vermont's Presumption of Parentage statute (as incorporated by
the Civil Union Act), but the inference is that a non-adoptive, non-biological partner
would be classified as a "parent" with rights to visitation or custody should the union
dissolve. Compare id. § 297.5(a), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002).
65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.2 (West 2004). The provision specifically states:
A legal union of two persons of the same sex, other than a marriage, that was
validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is substantially equivalent to a
domestic partnership as defined in this part, shall be recognized as a valid
domestic partnership in this state regardless of whether it bears the name
domestic partnership.
Id. Therefore, because California's domestic partnership law will have virtually identical
provisions to Vermont's Civil Union Act and because Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary
status grants fewer rights than California's domestic partnership status, the implication is
that California would recognize Vermont civil unions and Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary
relationships. See id. §§ 297.5(a), 297.5(d), 299.2; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4
(Michie 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1204(a), 1204(f) (2002).
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-6(a) (West Supp. 2004).
67. Compare id., with CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004). New Jersey domestic
partners are provided with hospital visitation rights, an inheritance tax exemption, state
income tax benefits, and state employee benefits. Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells
Heard Around the World: Years From Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About
Same-Sex Marriage?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 677 (2004). The New Jersey law, like
California's, also contains a provision regarding whether same-sex unions from other
states will be recognized in New Jersey. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-6(c) (West Supp. 2004);
see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004). The provision states that "[a] domestic
partnership, civil union or reciprocal beneficiary relationship entered into outside of this
State, which is valid under the laws of the jurisdiction under which the partnership was
created, shall be valid in this State." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-6(c) (West Supp. 2004). By
the express wording in the statute, New Jersey would recognize a California domestic
partnership, a Vermont civil union, and a Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary relationship, but
not a Massachusetts marriage. Id.
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law provides no specific provisions. However, New Jersey's general
child custody and visitation statutes allow any interested person to seek
custody or visitation when the child's custodial parent is deemed unfit.
69
4. Marriage.- Massachusetts
The landmark case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
70
paved the way to make the State of Massachusetts the first and only state
to allow same-sex marriage.71 In Goodridge, seven same-sex couples who
were denied marriage licenses challenged the state's marriage laws.7 A
plurality of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied the
"rational basis" standard and held that denying same-sex couples the
"protections, benefits, and obligations" of marriage violated the state
constitution.73
In an attempt to comply with the ruling, the state senate drafted a bill
that would have created "civil unions," like Vermont, but prohibited
same-sex marriage.74 The state senate requested an advisory opinion
68. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-6(c) (West Supp. 2004).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-9 (West 2002).
70. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
71. See id. at 948 (plurality opinion); Yvonne Abraham & Rick Klein, Free to Marry.
Historic Date Arrives for Same-Sex Couples in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17,
2004, at Al. Although same-sex couples are allowed to marry, prior Massachusetts law
restricts the issuance of marriage licenses to state residents. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
207, § 11 (West 1998). Specifically, the statute states that "[n]o marriage shall be
contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and intending to continue to reside in
another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction,
and every marriage contracted in this commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and
void." Id.
72 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949-50 (plurality opinion). The same-sex couples
alleged that the marriage statutes should be interpreted to permit same-sex marriage and
that preventing same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses violated the state
constitution. Id. at 950 (plurality opinion), The specific state constitutional provisions
that the plaintiffs alleged were violated were the liberty, freedom, equality, and due
process provisions. Id. at 950-51 (plurality opinion).
73. ld. at 968 (plurality opinion). Specifically, the plurality held:
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment
of the community for no rational reason. The absence of any reasonable
relationship between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex
couples that wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of
public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is
rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to
be) homosexual.
Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Greaney concurred with the result, the remedy, and much
of the reasoning of the plurality, but would have instead applied a "traditional equal
protection analysis." Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
74. S. 2175, 183rd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003), LEXIS 2003 Bill Text MA S.B.
2175.
20051 Modified Best Interest Standard 1247
from the Supreme Judicial Court on whether this proposed legislation
would violate the state constitution. 75 A majority of the court held that
the civil union scheme would violate the state constitution because the
legislation would "relegate same-sex couples to a different status., 76 As
of May 17, 2004, Massachusetts has been issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples]7 However, whether marriage licenses will continue to
be issued is questionable because of a proposed state constitutional
amendment limiting marriage to heterosexual couples.78
The decision in Goodridge also had an effect on child custody and
visitation rights. 79 Prior to Goodridge, when same-sex couples ended
their union, they were "in the highly unpredictable terrain of equity
jurisdiction."8s However, in light of the Goodridge decision to allow
same-sex couples to marry, the benefits conferred by marriage impliedly
include access to current Massachusetts divorce law.81  Under
Massachusetts divorce law, "the rights of [both] parents [to the child] in
the absence of misconduct, [should] be held to be equal.8 2 The court
must look to the best interest of the child to determine whether shared or
sole custody should be awarded. 3 However, if sole custody is awarded,
75. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
76. Id. at 569.
77. Abraham & Klein, supra note 71.
78. The court allowed the Massachusetts legislature 180 days from its November 17,
2003 opinion in Goodridge to develop appropriate legislation. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
970 (plurality opinion). The legislature convened a constitutional convention on February
11 and 12 of 2004, in an attempt to add an amendment to the constitution defining a
marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Baker, supra note 62, at 587.
Although the legislature could not agree on any one proposal, a plurality of legislators
voted for a compromise amendment, which limited marriage to heterosexual couples and
created civil unions for same-sex couples. Id. The proposed amendment must be
approved by the legislature again in 2005 and subsequently supported by a majority of the
people of Massachusetts in November 2006 before the amendment can become part of the
state constitution. Id.
79. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963-64 (plurality opinion). Children benefit from
the protections that are only available to married parents. See id. at 956 (plurality
opinion). Marriage provides children with "social [benefits] such as the enhanced
approval that still attends the status of being a marital child [and] material [benefits] such
as the greater ease of access to family-based State and Federal benefits." Id. at 957
(plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 963 (plurality opinion).
81. See id. at 963-64 (plurality opinion). The court appeared to classify access to
divorce law as a marital benefit because "divorce [law] providels] clear and reasonably
predictable guidelines for ... child custody ... on dissolution of marriage" that is denied
to same-sex couples. See id. at 963 (plurality opinion).
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 2005).
83. Id.
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the non-custodial parent will still receive visitation rights so long as the
best interest of the child is served. 84
With the high rate of mobility in our society, same-sex couples that
have entered into a recognized union will likely move to other states that
have no such unions and seek recognition of their relationship within the
new state.85 The majority of states have refused to recognize out-of-state,
same-sex unions." The following section details how these states haveexplicated their refusal to recognize out-of-state, same-sex unions.
D. Public Policy Against Same-Sex Unions
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, states must
recognize the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of all
other states.87 Regardless of the category to which marriages belong,
states traditionally recognize out-of-state marriages.88 However, states
are not strictly bound to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.8" The United
States Supreme Court has held that a state can refuse to recognize
another state's actions if doing so would violate a strong public policy of
the state.9° This public policy exception is embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.91 The public policy exception allows states
84. Id.
85. Wojcik, supra note 67, at 679.
86. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
87. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
88. Baker, supra note 62, at 609-10; Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay
Parents Must Be Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite
Anti-Marriage Statutes that Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV.
751, 757 (2003).
89. Baker, supra note 62, at 611.
90. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1998). Specifically, in Baker,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel "a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate"....
A court may be guided by the forum State's "public policy" in determining
the law applicable to a controversy.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971). The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to
the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates
the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
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to refuse to recognize same-sex unions solely because of a strong public
policy against them, provided that the forum state has the most
significant relationship to the parties.92
Reinforcing this public policy exception, Congress passed DOMA in
1996, permitting states to refuse to recognize same-sex unions.93 Forty-
four states have created their own "mini-DOMAs," or a functionally
equivalent statute, which explicitly set forth the state's public policy
against same-sex unions and their refusal to recognize them.94  The
Id. (emphasis added). The majority of states use the approach of the Restatement
(Second), but it is not mandated. Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws
Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 921.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); Baker, supra
note 62, at 609-10.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). The statute specifically states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
Id.
94. ALASKA CONSi. art. I, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (West, WESTLAW through 2004 Sess.);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-107, 9-11-109, 9-
11-208 (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004) (although California
recognizes domestic partnerships, the state decided to limit a marriage to a man and a
woman); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie 1999) (although Hawaii recognizes reciprocal beneficiaries,
the state has limited the availability of marriage to a man and a woman); IDAHO CODE §
32-209 (Michie 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-11-1-1 (Michie 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
101 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie 1999); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89
(West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 2-201 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1, 551.271 (West Supp. 2004);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp. 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (1999); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (Michie 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1 to 2 (1992); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:3 (Supp. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3101.01 (LEXIS through 125th Gen. Assembly); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1
(West 2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (Vernon 1998 & Supp.
2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002) (although
Vermont recognizes civil unions, the state decided to limit marriage to a man and a
woman); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020
(West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
765.001(2), 765.01, 765.04(1) (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (Michie 2003).
But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004) (recognizing domestic partnerships); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie 1999) (recognizing reciprocal beneficiary status); VT.
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United States Supreme Court has yet to be presented with the
opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of DOMA. 9 However,
Arizona and Washington have addressed the constitutionality of their
states' mini-DOMAs with differing results.96
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (recognizing civil unions). In the national and state
elections on November 2, 2004, eleven states (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah) joined Alaska,
Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada in passing ballot measures to amend their state
constitutions to define marriage as a union of one man and one woman. See Election
Results, CNN.cOM, at http://www.cnn.comIELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures
(last visited Apr. 24, 2005). Ten of these states (Oregon being the exception) already had
statutes that effectively limited the recognition of marriages to relationships between one
man and one woman. See statutes cited supra. After this election, fifteen states in total
will have constitutional amendments recognizing marriage as solely a relationship between
one man and one woman, and forty-four states overall will have statutes against same-sex
unions. See Election Results, supra. On April 13, 2005, Connecticut's House of
Representatives passed a bill to amend the state constitution to limit marriage to
heterosexual couples. Finer, supra note 44. If the amendment passes, the total number of
states that explicitly prohibit same-sex unions will be forty-five. Virginia's law is
representative of these laws:
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of
the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is
prohibited, Any such civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement
entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be
void in all respects in Virginia and any other contractual rights created thereby
shall be void and unenforceable.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (Michie 2004).
95. Scholars have varying opinions on how they think the United States Supreme
Court would rule on the constitutionality of the federal or state DOMAs. See, e.g., Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966-68 (1997); Anita Y. Woudenberg, Note, Giving
DOMA Some Credit: The Validity of Applying Defense of Marriage Acts to Civil Unions
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1509, 1567-68 (2004); see also
Cox, supra note 88, at 761-62.
96. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Castle v.
State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *12-13 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004).
Specifically, the Arizona court concluded that Arizona's mini-DOMA was constitutional,
Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 465, whereas the Washington court concluded that Washington's
mini-DOMA was unconstitutional, Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *16-17. Both state courts
looked at the effect that the denial of same-sex marriage would have on the children of
homosexual couples. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462-63; Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *14-16.
The Arizona court recognized that children raised in same-sex unions "could benefit from
the stability offered by same-sex marriage." Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 463. However, the
Arizona court felt that the state's interest in procreation in a heterosexual household
outweighed any benefits that children of same-sex couples would receive from recognizing
same-sex marriage and that any desire for change should be addressed to the legislature.
!d. The Washington court was much more concerned with the protection of children in
same-sex households. Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *15. The court stated that a family is
more than just
a man mating with a woman to have a child [and that] ...
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In child custody and visitation disputes between same-sex couples, the
mini-DOMAs (if constitutional) and their underlying public policy will
be considered by courts in determining whether a non-adoptive, non-
biological partner will be granted custody or visitation rights.97 However,
in addition to a state's interest in determining its own policy regarding
child custody and visitation disputes between same-sex couples, the best
interest of the child, being the almost universal standard applied in
custody and visitation disputes, should be considered. 9
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES
BETWEEN SAME-SEX COUPLES: APPROACHES AND THEIR
APPLICATIONS
A. Best Interest of the Child Standard and the Psychological Parent
Doctrine
In resolving custody and visitation disputes, virtually all courts utilize
the "best interest of the child" standard.99 Unfortunately, the standard is
[t]he children of same sex couples, a form of family already approved by the
community which approves of same sex couples adopting, or otherwise having
children, should not carry the stigma of coming from less than a family-a
government approved family. The private vows of an opposite sex couple that
can be crystallized into a government approved contract are not less stable if the
private vows of a same sex couple can be crystallized into a government
approved contract. In both cases there is more stability in the community.
Id. at *15-16 (footnote omitted). These two opinions illustrate possible outcomes in the
determination of the constitutionality of the mini-DOMAS and how the legal recognition
or non-recognition of same-sex unions could affect the children of those unions.
97. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9,
2004) (order and certification for interlocutory appeal) (holding that the non-biological,
non-adoptive partner cannot claim any parental rights to her partner's child because her
rights are based on a dissolved Vermont civil union and civil unions are not recognized
under Virginia's Marriage Affirmation Act).
98. Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the
Constitutional Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 252 (2001);
Bruce D. Gill, Comment, Best Interests of the Child? A Critique of Judicially Sanctioned
Arguments Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 68 TENN. L. REV. 361, 364
(2001).
99. See, e.g., Kyle C. Velte, Towards Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-
Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 299 (2000-2001) (agreeing that
only West Virginia does not use the best interest of the child standard in custody cases and
that only three states do not use the best interest of the child standard in visitation
disputes); Bell, supra note 98, at 252 (finding that all states, except West Virginia, utilize
the best interest of the child standard in custody disputes and that forty-seven states utilize
the best interest of the child standard in visitation disputes); see also Christensen, Legal
Ordering of Family Values, supra note 28, at 1348 ("Since the mid-nineteenth century, the
'best interests of the child' has been the predominant standard by which judicial public
ordering is employed to resolve custody and visitation disputes.").
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amorphous, lacking any uniformity in definition or apphcation.
Although the standard is not concrete, courts typically look at a variety
of factors including the following: moral unfitness of the parent;
biological and psychological relationship of the child to the parent;
wishes of the child; health, welfare, and social behavior of the child;
evidence of abuse; and parenting ability)"
Intimately connected with the best interest standard is the
psychological parent doctrine.' °  A psychological parent has a
100. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 98, at 364; Starr, supra note 33, at 1502.
101. Angela Dunne Tiritilli & Susan Ann Koenig, Advocacy for Nebraska Children
with Gay and Lesbian Parents: A Call for the Best Interests of the Child To Be Paramount
in the Case of Non-Biological, Non-Adoptive Parents, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 18 (2002);
Gill, supra note 98, at 364-66; Starr, supra note 33, at 1501-02.
102. See, e.g., Philip F. Schuster II, Constitutional and Family Law Implications of the
Sleeper and Troxel Cases: A Denouement for Oregon's Psychological Parent Statute?, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 549, 574 (2000) (indicating that the best interests of the child
standard and the psychological parent standard have fused). Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert Solnit originally developed the psychological parent doctrine. See, e.g.,
KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 57, at 719; Bell, supra note 98, at 260-61. Goldstein, Freud
and Solnit explained the doctrine as follows:
[Wihen a child is in the direct and continuous care of an adult for a significant
period of time, the child will form a closer and more significant relationship with
this adult than with the biological parents. Separation from these non-biological,
so called "psychological parents," is "no less painful and no less damaging to a
child than separation from natural or adoptive caregiving parents."
Stephanie Moes, Note, Being Seen and Heard: Webster v. Ryan's Constitutional Protection
for Children's Right To Maintain Contact with Foster Parents, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 331, 339
(2002) (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 105
(1996)). Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit intended the doctrine to be applicable only in
custody disputes, and not visitation disputes where they believe the custodial parent
should have the sole right to determine who can visit with the child. KRAUSE ET AL.,
supra note 57, at 707, 719 (citing GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 24). However, courts that
currently apply the psychological parent doctrine do so in both custody and visitation
disputes. E.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding grant of
joint custody of child to former lesbian couple on the ground that the non-adoptive
partner was a psychological parent to the child), cert. denied, No. 04SC528, 2004 Colo.
LEXIS 851 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004); V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) (upholding grant of visitation to the non-adoptive, non-biological partner on
the ground that she was a psychological parent to the children), affd, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
2000). Courts and commentators alike have equated the psychological parent doctrine
with such equitable doctrines as "de facto" parent, "in loco parentis," "equitable" parent,
and "functional parent," at times using the terms interchangeably or creating a new name
altogether to refer to the core ideas these doctrines share. See, e.g., In re Parentage of
L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 282-84 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing cases from other jurisdictions
which applied the psychological parent doctrine, the de facto parent doctrine, or in loco
parentis to grant a non-biological, non-adoptive same-sex partner standing as evidence for
allowing standing based on a claim of being a de facto or psychological parent in its own
jurisdiction), reh'g granted, 101 P.3d 107 (Wash. 2004); Bell, supra note 98, at 260
(choosing the term "'psychosocial' parent" to refer to parent-child relationships based on
a "psychological bond" and "physical and emotional nurturing" instead of the "'de facto,'
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relationship with a child "with deep emotional bonds such that the child
recognizes the person, independent of the legal form of the relationship,
as a parent from whom they receive daily guidance and nurturance."'' 3
Courts employ different methods to classify individuals as psychological
parents; '04 however, many courts use the following four-part test
developed in Wisconsin: (1) the legal parent consented to and fostered
the nonparent's relationship with the child; (2) the nonparent and the
child lived in the same household; (3) the nonparent assumed significant
responsibilities in the care and upbringing of the child; and (4) the
nonparent has established a parental role which created a dependent
relationship with the child.'O This test places strict limits on who can
claim to be a psychological parent and therefore protects parents from
frivolous claims.106
'equitable,' 'functional,' or 'psychological' parenting doctrine[s]," which the author views
as "slightly misleading"); Osborne, supra note 5, at 378 (equating the psychological parent
doctrine with the de facto parent doctrine). For purposes of this Comment, reference to
the psychological parent doctrine will encompass all similar doctrines.
103. E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 559. With the composition of the traditional family
changing to include individuals other than a child's biological parents, courts and
commentators advocate greater use of the psychological parent doctrine to allow third
parties to seek child custody or visitation. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 57, at 718-19;
Bell, supra note 98, at 262. The highest courts of New Jersey, Alaska, Colorado,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Utah, and Wisconsin have granted third parties standing to seek
visitation or custody of a child based on the psychological parent doctrine. Bell, supra
note 98, at 274. In addition, states such as Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,
and Oregon have adopted psychological parent statutes. Schuster, supra note 102, at 610.
The psychological parent doctrine, in theory, takes into account the interests of the parent,
the third party, and the child through its mandated evaluation of the psychological bond
the child shares with both the parent and the third party. See Osborne, supra note 5, at
385; Vanessa L. Warzynski, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: The "Psychological
Parent" Standard, 39 VILL. L. REV. 737, 771 (1994). However, because the psychological
parent doctrine "is a fluid concept based on complex human interaction that changes and
evolves over time, [it is subject to inconsistent definitions and] unpredictable variables."
Schuster, supra note 102, at 630.
104. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004) (refusing to define de
facto parent, but stating the status should "be limited to those adults who have fully and
completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental
role in the child's life"); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(defining an in loco parentis relationship as one "where the child has established strong
psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the
child and provided care, nurture, and affection, assuming in the child's eye a stature like
that of a parent").
105. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
106. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (arguing that the four-part test
will prevent individuals such as babysitters and nannies from claiming parental rights
because relationships based solely on payment for services do not rise to the level of a
psychological parent).
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B. The Initial Hurdle - Standing in Non-Adoptive, Non-Biological
Partner Child Custody and Visitation Cases'07
In all custody and visitation disputes, the courts should utilize a
"bifurcated analysis."' ° The court should first determine whether the
individual seeking custody or visitation has standing and only after
standing has been determined, should the best interests of the child be
considered.' ® However, the judicial decisions in the area of child custody
and visitation are "overwhelmingly confused" as many court opinions fail
to address standing.1 0 An additional problem leading to inconsistency
among judicial decisions is that courts often do not apply the same
standard in determining whether or not a third party has standing.'
1. Rationales for Granting Standing to the Non-Adoptive, Non-
Biological Partner
a. The Psychological Parent Doctrine
The majority of courts that have granted standing to the non-adoptive,
non-biological same-sex partner seeking custody or visitation rights,
including those cases which reached the merits, did so through the
psychological parent doctrine. In In re E.L.M.C.,"3 a Colorado court
upheld a joint parental responsibilities order between a same-sex couple,
noting "that emotional harm to a young child is intrinsic in the
termination or significant curtailment of the child's relationship with a
psychological parent under any definition of that term."11 4 Many other
courts also utilize the psychological parent doctrine." 5
107. The case law almost exclusively deals with lesbians rather than gay men in
custody disputes. See infra Part lI.B. However, the analysis is applicable to all same-sex
couples.
108. Osborne, supra note 5, at 376.
109. Id.
110. See Polikoff, supra note 6, at 508. In disputes between same-sex couples, some
courts have ruled on custody or visitation without discussing the standing of the non-
biological, non-adoptive partner while other courts devote the majority of their opinion to
standing. See id. at 508-09.
111. See Warzynski, supra note 103, at 752.
112. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, No.
04SC528, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 851 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886,
891 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), affd,
748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); see also In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis.
1995).
113. 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, No. 04SC528, 2004 Colo. LEXIS
851 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004).
114. Id. at 561.
115. See, e.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891; VC, 725 A.2d at 23. In ENO., the
Massachusetts court held that recognition of a de facto parent was in accord with the
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b. The Intended Parent Doctrine
California has used the intended-parent doctrine to extend parental
rights to the non-adoptive, non-biological same-sex partner.'1 6  This
doctrine traditionally has been used in cases involving artificial
reproduction and surrogacy in order to determine parentage."7 The
doctrine focuses on the intent of the parties when a child is conceived
through analysis of such factors as: "the relationship between the parties,
the parties' statements on parentage, their plans for raising the child, and
their subsequent conduct in carrying out those plans. '18 In one case, a
California appellate court held that because the child would not have
been conceived but for the actions of both parties, the non-adoptive,
non-biological partner had standing to seek custody or visitation."19
2. Rationales for Denying Standing to the Non-A doptive, Non-
Biological Partner
a. Strict Statutory Construction
Various courts have denied the non-adoptive, non-biological partner
child custody or visitation rights by focusing exclusively on statutory
language, particularly on the definition of "parent" and the list of those
changing perception of the family and that "the best interests calculus must include an
examination of the child's relationship with both his legal and de facto parent." E.N.O.,
711 N.E.2d at 891. In V.C., the New Jersey court relied on the assessment of experts that
the children had formed a psychological attachment to the non-biological partner in
making their decision that visitation with the non-biological partner should continue.
V.C., 725 A.2d at 23; see also T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914-15 (Pa. 2001) (holding that
same-sex partner who was named guardian to the child in the biological mother's will and
shared in the daily responsibilities of child rearing had established the requisite
psychological bond with the child so that it was in the child's best interest to grant her
standing in loco parentis to litigate the issue of whether the relationship should continue);
In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 285-86 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that partner of
child's biological mother, with whom she had been in a twelve year relationship and who
was the primary care-taker when the child was young, met the requirements of the 4-part
psychological parent test permitting her standing to determine whether the relationship
should continue), reh'g granted, 101 P.3d 107 (Wash. 2004).
116. See Kristine Rcnee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 144-45 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004), depublished and review granted, 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004).
117. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of
Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1425-26 (1998).
118. Kristine Renee H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 145.
119. Id. at 145-46; see also In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that both partners of a former same-sex couple were the legal parents of a
child conceived through artificial insemination where the biological mother intended to
conceive and raise a child with her former partner and "actively fostered a parent-child
relationship").
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individuals able to assert standing. 20 For example, in In re Thompson,
the court focused on the definition of "parent" under Tennessee law,
which is defined as "any biological, legal, adoptive parent(s) or, . . .
stepparents."022 The court then held that the "law does not provide for
any award of custody or visitation to a nonparent except as may be
otherwise provided by our legislature.1 23  Other jurisdictions are in
accord. 124
b. Presumption in Favor of the Biological or Adoptive Parent
Some courts presumptively favor the biological or adoptive parent's
decision to terminate entirely the former same-sex partner's visitation
rights by denying the former partner standing, unless the biological or
adoptive parent is unfit. 25 However, even if this showing of unfitness is
made, the judge has wide discretion to refuse to grant custodial or
visitation rights to the partner.
26
120. See, e.g., In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320 (I11. App. Ct. 1999); In re Thompson, 11
S.W.3d 913,919 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
121. 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(36) (2001).
123. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 919 (emphasis omitted).
124. See, e.g., CB.L., 723 N.E.2d. at 320. In In re C.B.L., an Illinois court denied
standing to assert parental rights to a same-sex partner's child because "same-sex partner"
was not listed in the categories of persons who could have standing under the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Id. at 320. For another example, see Music v.
Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curium), where a Florida
court denied standing as a de facto parent to the non-adoptive, non-biological partner who
had assisted in the raising of the child for three years because visitation rights are
statutory.
125. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 107, 109-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that the status of in loco parentis is determined solely by marriage and is
not applicable to a same-sex couple and that Florida law requires a showing that the
parent is unfit which was not alleged); In re Jones, No. 2000 CA 56, 2002 WL 940195, at *7
(Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (holding that former same-sex partner is not a parent within
the meaning of the statute and cannot receive rights to a child she helped raise unless she
proves the biological parent is unfit).
126. See, e.g., S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 14, 18-19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding
that although an expert testified to the fact that the non-biological, non-adoptive parent
was a de facto parent to the child and should maintain visitation, the court acted within its
discretion to refuse to grant such visitation). In applying the presumption in favor of the
biological or adoptive parent, a court will not inquire into the psychological bond that the
child shared with the non-adoptive, non-biological partner to determine whether it is in
the child's best interest to grant standing to the partner to determine if custody or
visitation should be awarded. See, e.g., Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 110.
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C. Illustration of the Complexities in Child Custody and Visitation
Disputes Between Same-Sex Couples. Miller-Jenkins
12
7
Lisa Miller and Janet Jenkins met and began a relationship in
Virginia. 2  On December 19, 2000, they traveled to Vermont and
entered into a civil union. 29 The parties later decided to have a child
together, and Lisa was artificially inseminated with anonymous donor
sperm that Janet helped select. 30 Lisa became pregnant and on April 16,
2002, she gave birth to a daughter named Isabella. 3'
Lisa and Janet moved to Vermont with Isabella in July of 2002 in order
to take advantage of the state's favorable laws regarding same-sex
couples. 112 In the fall of 2003, the parties decided to separate and onNovember 24, 2003, Lisa filed a petition to dissolve the civil union in the
127. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fain.
Ct. filed Nov. 24, 2003); No, CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed July 1, 2004). The summation of
the facts and case disposition is based on court documents from the Rutland Family Court
in Vermont (Vermont court) and the Frederick County Circuit Court in Virginia (Virginia
court) as of March 18, 2005, provided by Joseph Price, Esq., counsel for the Defendant,
Janet Miller-Jenkins, unless otherwise noted.
128. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam.
Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion).
129. Id. The parties returned to Virginia to continue their relationship. Id.
130. Id. Lisa was four years younger than Janet, which is why the couple decided that
Lisa should carry the child. Janet Miller-Jenkins, Rights Violated, CALEDONIAN-RECORD
NEWS (St. Johnsbury, Vt.), July 21, 2004, http://www.caledonianrecord.com/pages/
letters-to-editor/story/a44fl40fa. Lisa and Janet allegedly selected a sperm donor with
Janet's physical characteristics so that the child would look like both women. Justin
Bergman, Woman Sues Partner for Custody, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), Aug. 13, 2004,
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20040813&Category=NEWS
03&ArtNo=208130305&ScctionCat=FRONTPAGE&Template=printar.
131. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2004)
(order granting contempt motion). Janet was in the delivery room with Lisa when Isabella
was born and cut the umbilical cord. Id. It is alleged that only Lisa's name is listed on
Isabella's birth certificate as a parent. Andrew Martel, Girl Caught in Lesbian Custody
Fight, WINCHESTER STAR (Virginia), Aug. 14, 2004, http://www.winchesterstar.com/
TheWinchesterStar/040814/Area_Girl.asp. Janet allegedly paid for three attempts at
artificial insemination; the third attempt resulted in Isabella. Miller-Jenkins, supra note
130.
132. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2004)
(order granting contempt motion); see also Affidavit of Janet Miller-Jenkins, Miller-
Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004). This move allegedly occurred two
months after Isabella was born. Miller-Jenkins, supra note 130. Janet alleges that she
never adopted Isabella because she believed that Vermont's Civil Union Act would
protect her parental interests. Adrian Brune, Custody Case Puts Va. Law on Trial:
'Marriage Affirmation Act' Invalidates Vt. Civil Union, 'Ex-Lesbian' Mom Claims, WASH.
BLADE, Aug. 20, 2004, http://www.washingtonblade.com2004/8-20/news/localnews/maa.
cfm.
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Rutland Family Court in Vermont."' Lisa requested legal and physical
custody of Isabella; however, she waived her right to challenge Janet's
parentage and Janet's right to seek visitation.
3 4
Later, Lisa changed her mind and attempted to revoke her waiver so
as to challenge Janet's rights to visitation and custody.' The Vermont
court issued a temporary order of parental rights on June 17, 2004,
granting Lisa temporary legal and physical custody of Isabella while also
granting Janet visitation rights. 1
36
Two weeks later, on July 1, 2004, Lisa sought to establish parentage of
Isabella in the Frederick County Circuit Court in Virginia.'37 On July 7,
133. Summons, Complaint for Civil Union Dissolution Notice of Appearance and
Affidavit of Child Custody, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County
Fain. Ct. Nov. 24, 2003). Janet alleges that their union started to fall apart in July of 2003
after Lisa miscarried a second child. Miller-Jenkins, supra note 130. Janet claims that
instead of trying to work through the episode together, Lisa decided to end the
relationship. Id.
134. Summons, Complaint for Civil Union Dissolution Notice of Appearance and
Affidavit of Child Custody, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County
Fain. Ct. Nov. 24, 2003). Lisa was not opposed to Janet having supervised visits with
Isabella and in addition, sought child support from Janet. Id.
135. Motion To Establish Parentage and Enforce Contempt, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-
11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. May 17, 2004). Lisa has filed multiple motions
to revoke her waiver to challenge parentage. See Plaintiff's Motion To Withdraw Waiver
To Challenge Presumption of Parentage, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03RcDMd (Vt.
Rutland County Fain. Ct. May 26, 2004); Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of
Temporary Order, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03RcDMd (Vt. Rutland County Farn. Ct.
June 9, 2004); Plaintiff's Objection To Presumption of Parentage, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-
11-03Dmd (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. July 2, 2004); Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration and To Alter and Amend Order of 7-19-04 and Temporary Order,
Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03RcDMd (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. July 26, 2004). This
issue has yet to be ruled on. See Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County
Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion).
136. Miller-Jenkins, No. F454-11-03Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. June 17,
2004) (temporary order granting parental rights and responsibilities). Janet was granted
specific dates of visitation with Isabella in Virginia in June and July, but starting in
August, Janet was granted visitation with Isabella at her residence in Vermont for the
third full week of each month beginning on a Saturday morning and ending on a Sunday
evening. Id. at 1-2. In addition, the court ordered that Janet be permitted telephone
contact with Isabella once per day while Isabella remained with Lisa. Id. at 3. The
hearing date had been delayed multiple times at the request of Lisa for various reasons
(including her need for new counsel because she had a disagreement with her previous
counsel over her waiver of a challenge to Janet's parental rights). Motion To Delay
Action, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. May 17, 2004).
137. Petition to Establish Parentage and for Declaratory Relief, Miller-Jenkins, No.
CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 1, 2004). On April 21, 2004, Virginia amended its Affirmation
of Marriage Act, 2004 Va. Acts ch. 983 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (Michie
2004)) refusing to recognize any same-sex unions from another state. See § 20-45.3. The
Act became effective on July 1, 2004. See Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm, at 3 (Vt.
Rutland County Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion).
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2004, Janet filed an emergency motion for contempt and enforcement
against Lisa in the Vermont court for failure to comply with the court's
visitation order.18 The Vermont court issued an entry order on July 19,
reaffirming its jurisdiction and temporary order.3 9
On July 29, 2004, Janet filed a motion in the Virginia court seeking a
dismissal of the complaint and costs) 40  Lisa then sought to enjoin
visitation against Janet on August 12."' Six days later, the Virginia court
stayed all visitation but permitted Janet supervised visits pending further
court action. 142  On August 19, 2004, the two judges involved, Judge
Cohen of Vermont and Judge Prosser of Virginia, conferred about the
case in a conference call. 4 3 On September 2, 2004, the Vermont court
found Lisa in contempt of the visitation order, but did not impose
sanctions.'4 On September 8, 2004, the Virginia court asserted it had
jurisdiction, but certified the matter for appeal. 145 On October 15, 2004,
the Virginia court held that Lisa was the sole legal parent of Isabella and
138. Emergency Motion for Contempt and Enforcement, Miller-Jenkins, No. F454-11-
03Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. July 8, 2004). Lisa complied with the order for the
first required visitation in June, but refused any additional visitation with Isabella. Id. In
addition, Lisa has not allowed Janet to talk on the phone with Isabella and returned a
letter and pictures that Janet attempted to send to Isabella. Id. Janet filed a second
motion for contempt in August. Defendant's Second Motion for Contempt and Motion
for Immediate Hearing, Miller-Jenkins, No. F454-11-03Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fain.
Ct. Aug. 3, 2004).
139. Miller-Jenkins, No. F454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. July 19,
2004) (order asserting continuing jurisdiction).
140. Respondent's Demurrer and Motion for Costs, Fees and Expenses, Miller-
Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2004).
141. Motion to Enjoin Visitation, Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12,
2004).
142. Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004) (order to stay
visitation).
143. Record of Conference Call Between Judge Prosser and Judge Cohen, Miller-
Jenkins, No. 04000280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2004). Communication between the courts
was required by the UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JUSTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT Acr §
206, 9 U.L.A. 680 (1999), which has been adopted in Virginia, 2001 Va. Acts ch. 305
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-146.9 (Michie 2004)). The substance of the conversation
included both judges discussing how the case had proceeded and would continue to
proceed in their respective courts. See Record of Conference Call Between Judge Prosser
and Judge Cohen, Miller-Jenkins, No. 04000280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2004). Both judges
acknowledged that the results reached in each court would be at odds with each other
based on the different laws in Virginia and Vermont. Id. at 8-9. Both judges elected to
continue with the proceedings in both courts with the understanding that they would meet
soon to discuss the case. Id. at 9-10.
144. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2004)
(order granting contempt motion).
145. Miller-Jenkins, No. CH04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2004) (order exercising
jurisdiction).
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that Janet had no parental rights. 146 Almost a month later on November
17, the Vermont court handed down a conflicting ruling, holding that
Janet was a legal parent to Isabella under the Civil Union Act and the
case was set for a final hearing on parental rights. 47 On December 21,
2004, the Vermont court refused to grant judgment for Lisa based on the
Virginia court's October 15 ruling49 At the time of this writing, Janet
has appealed the Virginia ruling and both parties are awaiting a date to
be set for oral arguments in Virginia14 and the final hearing on parental
rights in Vermont."'
This case illustrates the complexities of a child custody and visitation
dispute after the dissolution of a same-sex union. 5' The remainder of
this Comment will analyze the Miller-Jenkins case in conjunction with
the available standards to resolve these disputes in order to highlight
their advantages and disadvantages and to develop a standard that is
equitable to all parties concerned.
II. FINDING A UNIFORM STANDARD: ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF APPLYING ESTABLISHED APPROACHES TO SAME-
SEX COUPLES
A. Need for a Uniform Standard
Courts and commentators do not agree on any one method to resolve
112
child custody and visitation disputes between former same-sex couples.
Generally, federal law defers to the states in family law matters, allowing
each state to develop its own policies.1 53 However, there is a legitimate
146. Brief of Appellant at 3, 9, Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654-04-4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2005).
147. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm, at 13 (Vt. Rutland County Fain. Ct. Nov. 17,
2004) (order recognizing parental interest in both parties).
148. Brief for Appellant at 4, Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654-04-4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2005).
149. See Brief of Appellant at 33, Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654-04-4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2005); Brief of Appellee at 30, Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654-04-4 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2005);
Reply Brief of Appellant at 10, Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654-04-4 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2005).
150. See Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm, at 13 (Vt. Rutland County Faro. Ct. Nov.
17, 2004) (order recognizing parental interest in both parties).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 128-50.
152. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 867 (stating that court decisions are "in a state of flux and
inconsistency"); see supra Part II.B.
153. See, e.g., Kovalcik, supra note 21, at 820 ("The courts agree that states have a
strong interest in the welfare and health of the children. Consequently, the state has
traditionally been justified in intervening in the family sphere where it appears that the
parent's decision is jeopardizing the child."); Silverthorn, supra note 21, at 897 ("[E]ach
state legislature has discretion to determine the scope and direction of its family laws ...
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concern that maintaining the state-by-state variation will result in forum
shopping; either member of the same-sex couple could move with the
child to a state favorable to his or her position, meet the jurisdictional
requirements, and file a custody or visitation action to the detriment of
the other party.14 Under the statutes governing initial jurisdiction, the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), enacted by
Congress, "5  and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), adopted in thirty-one states,"5 the
residency requirement is six consecutive months immediately prior to
litigation.5 7 Therefore, if the biological or adoptive parent wanted to
prevent his or her same-sex partner from having rights to the child, he or
she could move with the child to a state against same-sex unions, remain
there for six consecutive months, establish priority jurisdiction in that
state, and then file a custody or visitation action. 8 One of Janet Miller-
Jenkins' attorneys, Joseph Price, stated the problem as it pertains to
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional protection of parental rights."
(footnote omitted)); see also KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 57, at 19.
154. See, e.g., Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together
Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1128 (1996) (arguing that a uniform standard will prevent
forum shopping because the outcome reached would not depend on the jurisdiction in
which the child custody or visitation dispute is heard); Velte, supra note 99, at 256 (arguing
that "protection of the non-legal parent-child relationship depends solely on jurisdictional
location of the lesbian-parented family when it dissolves").
155. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568, § 8(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000)).
156. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 57, at 628.
157. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(b)(4), 1738A(c)(2)(A) (2000); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 671 (1999). The purpose
of the UCCJEA was to clarify interpretation of the PKPA. Celia Guzaldo Gamrath,
UCCJEA: A New Approach to Custody Jurisdiction and Interstate Custody and Visitation,
92 ILL. B.J. 204, 206 (2004). Therefore, the provisions of the UCCJEA conform to the
PKPA. Id.
158. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(b)(4), 1738A(c)(2)(A); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 671 (1999). One of the
main objectives of the PKPA was to prevent a parent from kidnapping his or her child and
allowing the state to which the child was taken to have jurisdiction over the case. Melissa
Crawford, Note, In the Best Interests of the Child? The Misapplication of the UCCIA and
the PKPA to Interstate Adoption Custody Disputes, 19 VT. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1994).
Although the moving of the biological or adoptive parent with the child to a jurisdiction
against same-sex unions is not kidnapping, it is effectively an end run around the PKPA
because it accomplishes the same result the PKPA sought to avoid; the parent with the
child gets to choose the state of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; see also Christopher
L. Blakesley, Comparativist Ruminations from the Bayou on Child Custody Jurisdiction:
The UCCJA, the PKPA, and the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, 58 LA. L. REV.
449, 467 (1998) (defining child abduction as "when one parent breaches another's right to
custody by removing the child from his 'home state' or 'habitual residence' and takes him
to another jurisdiction, or when the parent retains the child in contravention of another's
custodial rights or interests").
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Virginia, though applicable in any state that prohibits same-sex unions:
"Virginia could become the Las Vegas of gay divorces. You would
simply pack up and move to Virginia, and your partner would have no
rights .... 159 A uniform standard is needed in the states that prohibit
same-sex unions to prevent forum shopping and reduce the uncertainty
and inconsistency found in past court decisions9
B. Possible Standards and Their Advantages and Disadvantages
1. Biological Parent Presumption
There are several options to achieve a uniform standard in child
custody and visitation disputes between former same-sex couples. One
option is to award child custody solely to the biological or adoptive
parent and deny visitation to the non-biological, non-adoptive partner on
the ground that these individuals have no standing to assert parental
rights.1 ' This logic would fall in line with the rationale that previous
courts have used to deny parental rights to the non-biological, non-
adoptive partner by presuming that interference with a biological parent
is unwarranted unless the parent is unfit. Applying this rationale to the
Miller-Jenkins case, Lisa, because she is the biological mother of Isabella,
would be awarded sole legal and physical custody of her daughter.
6
1
This standard, however, would likely fail on constitutional grounds
because various members of the United States Supreme Court have
indicated that biology alone is not enough; a child's right to maintain a
relationship with a third party should also be taken into consideration.
This view is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court has denied
custody or visitation to biological parents in cases where no previous
159. Kalita, supra note 14.
160. See, e.g., Kaas, supra note 154, at 1128 (arguing that "a unitary test, or at least
consistently defined standards" should be created because a uniform standard would
prevent forum shopping); Velte, supra note 99, at 256 (arguing that the present state laws
are inconsistently applied and that courts should seek consistency and predictability in
child custody and visitation cases); Warzynski, supra note 103, at 752 (arguing that
"[b]ecause [none of the courts of the respective states] apply exactly the same standard,
inconsistency and uncertainty in the law linger").
161. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In
re Jones, No. 2000 CA 56, 2002 WL 940195, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002).
162. See Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 109; Jones, 2002 WL 940195, at *7.
163. See supra Part I1.B.2(b).
164. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88-89 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 98
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children's
Rights in Judicial Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 FAM. L.Q. 105, 132-33
(2002).
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relationship with the child existed.'6 5 This view is additionally supported
by the fact that state courts have granted custody or visitation rights to
some third parties who did form a relationship with the child.
' 6
2. Public Policy Exception
A second option for a uniform standard would be for states to utilize
the public policy exception embodied in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. 67  Forty-four states have mini-DOMAs, or a
functionally equivalent statute, outlining that state's refusal to recognize
same-sex unions."8 Presuming such laws are constitutional, courts could
refuse to hear these cases or grant sole legal and physical custody to the
biological or adoptive parent based on their public policy against same-
sex unions. 69 If a court chooses not to hear the case, the parties would
have to seek another forum, possibly the forum in which the union was
created, thus requiring the application of that state's law. 70 For example,
if the same-sex union was formed in California or Vermont, these states
have statutes that specifically state that both members of the same-sex
165. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
166. See, e.g., In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 516 (Ct. App. 1992); Francis v.
Francis, 654 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind. App. 1995). In addition, commentators state that the
parental right to be free of state interference in the care and custody of a child may not be
as fundamental as once thought, based on the Court's analysis in Troxel, which involved a
balancing test more reminiscent of intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 279, 302-03 (arguing that "the court has strayed from the fundamental rights
approach" because the Court in Troxel implied that harm to the child is not necessary for
state involvement, refused to announce a standard, appeared to embrace the best interests
of the child standard which would impair the right of the parent to determine who can visit
with a child, and refused to find that litigation over custody harmed the parent's
effectiveness in raising a child); Bell, supra note 98, at 242-43 (arguing that the Court
"applied a middle-tier balancing analysis" which is reminiscent of "intermediate scrutiny,
requiring a balancing of parents' rights against the state's authority to intervene for the
welfare of children").
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971). This option
assumes that because these states refuse to recognize relationships based on a same-sex
union, they will also refuse to recognize any rights that flowed from that same-sex union,
including child custody and visitation rights.
168. Supra note 94.
169. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to
dissolve a civil union formed in Vermont). The Georgia court relied on the state's mini-
DOMA, only recognizing a union between one man and one woman, and on the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to hold that it had "no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances
to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to
consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights." Id. at 49.
170. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1032 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-146.12 (Michie 2004).
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couple are joint parents of the child.17 ' Because California and Vermont
have statutes on point, most likely, the biological or adoptive parent,
such as Lisa in the Miller-Jenkins case, would retain legal and physical
custody of the child, but the non-adoptive, non-biological partner, such
as Janet, would receive visitation rights.17 However, if the second forum
was also a state that had a public policy against same-sex unions, that
state could refuse to hear the case, forcing the parties to seek yet another
forum.7 3  This solution is neither practical nor beneficial and
demonstrates how the forum can dictate the outcome of a case.174
If a state that does not recognize same-sex unions chooses to hear the
case, the probable result is that the non-adoptive, non-biological partner,
such as Janet in the Miller-Jenkins case, would not be recognized as a
parent to the child and would receive no custody or visitation rights.
7
1
This eventuality was later confirmed in the Miller-Jenkins case, when the
Virginia court held that Lisa was Isabella's sole parent and that Janet had
no parental rights.'76
3. Best Interest
The aforementioned two options do not take into account the other
individual who is involved in these proceedings - the child.177 The third
option would be to look solely to the best interest of the child.'78 Many
scholars have argued that with the changing dynamics of families to
include children forming psychological bonds with third parties, the
presumptive deference given to biological parents is no longer warranted
and that the child's right to continue the relationship should be given
171. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f)
(2000).
172. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. F454-11-03Rddm, at 1-2 (Vt. Rutland
County Fam. Ct. June 17, 2004) (order granting temporary parental rights and
responsibilities); Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03, at 13 (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. Nov.
17, 2004) (order recognizing parental interests in both parties).
173. See, e.g., Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49.
174. See, e.g., Warzynski, supra note 103, at 752 (arguing because states do not apply a
uniform standard, "parents involved in custody [or visitation] disputes lack adequate
guidance in decision-making"), As Judge Cohen states in the Miller-Jenkins case, "the
judicial system as a whole simply cannot allow parties to try to take advantage of legal and
cultural differences which may make one state favor the position of a particular party over
another." Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm, at 6 (Vt. Rutland County Fam. Ct. Sept. 2,
2004) (order granting contempt motion).
175. See Record of Conference Call Between Judge Prosser and Judge Cohen at 7-9,
Miller-Jenkins, No. 04000280 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2004).
176. Brief of Appellant at 3, 9, Miller-Jenkins, No. 2654-04-4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2005).
177. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
178. See supra Part II.A.
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greater weight.7 9 Even the United States Supreme Court is beginning to
back away from complete deference to the wishes of biological parents;
one commentator noted how "it appears that at least six of the [current]
justices would weigh children's interest in protection of intimate
relationships in the balance of constitutional rights." 8° Justice Stevens
has gone so far as to say that a child's right to maintain "familial or
family-like bonds [is] fundamental." '
In determining the best interest of the child in custody and visitation
disputes involving same-sex individuals, courts frequently rely on same-S- 182
sex parenting studies. Much of the research done to date has found few
differences between children reared by one or two homosexual parents
as opposed to heterosexual parents."" However, many commentators
criticize these studies as having significant methodological flaws that
prevent any generalizations to be drawn.1 4 Additionally, some of these
179. See Woodhouse, supra note 164, at 133; Moes, supra note 102, at 337-38; Erin E.
Wynne, Note, Children's Rights and the Biological Bias: A Comparison Between The
United States and Canada in Biological Parent Versus Third-Party Custody Disputes, 11
CONN. J. INT'L L. 367,375-76 (1996).
180. Woodhouse, supra note 164, at 113.
181. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
182. William C. Duncan, Same-Sex Parenting Studies and the Law, in ROBERT
LERNER AND ALTHEA K. NAGAI, No BASIS 124-133 (2001) (discussing various adoption
and same-sex marriage cases that have considered same-sex parenting studies); see also
Affidavit of Steven Lowell Nock at 2, Halpern v. Canada, [July 12, 2002] No. 684/00, 2002
Can. LII 42749 (evaluating United States same-scx parenting studies), available at
http://www.canlii.org/oncas/onscdc/2002/2002onscdclOOOO.html.
183. See, e.g., Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation
of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 159, 159 (2001); Tye, supra note 7, at 92. One
frequently cited commentator, Charlotte J. Patterson, succinctly summarizes the research
by stating:
Overall, the picture emerging from social science research on children with
lesbian and gay parents is very positive. Based on the research literature, there is
no reason to believe that children of lesbian or gay parents are behind their peers
in any aspect of personal or social development. In other words, the biases
against lesbian and gay families are unsubstantiated, based solely on prejudice.
Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 200-01 (1995); see also Ball &
Pea, supra note 37, at 271 (arguing that the research shows that homosexuals "who are in a
committed relationship can provide a structured and supportive form of familial care
giving"); Kathryn Kendall, Sexual Orientation and Child Custody, TRIAL, Aug. 1999, at 42,
42 (stating that research has found no differences in "gender identity, sexual orientation,
self-esteem, and social adjustment" of children reared by homosexual parents as opposed
to heterosexual parents).
184. See, e.g., LERNER & NAGAI, supra note 182, at 3, 21, 29-30, 69 (evaluating forty-
nine same-sex parenting studies and finding such problems as unclear or inappropriate
hypotheses, lack of control for extraneous variables, inadequate or no control groups,
researcher bias, sampling deficiencies, and flawed statistical analyses which preclude
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1235
same commentators argue that other studies show that children reared
by homosexual parents are more likely to develop high-risk behaviors
such as sexual promiscuity, gender identity confusion, and anxiety,
lending weight to the view that it is in the child's best interest to be raised
exclusively by heterosexual parents.
85
The results are arguably inconclusive, but they do not rule out the
possibility that it is in the child's best interest to be with a loving family
regardless of the parents' sexual orientation.8 6 However, critics argue
that the best interest standard is too amorphous and flexible, allowing
judges to let their personal feelings dictate their judgment and leaving
parents to guess how their cases will be resolved."7
Applying the traditional best interest of the child standard to the
Miller-Jenkins case, Janet should, at the very least, be granted visitation
generalizations from being made); George Rekers & Mark Kilgus, Studies of Homosexual
Parenting: A Critical Review, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 343, 346-53, 361 (2001-2002)
(criticizing current same-sex parenting studies for such problems as sampling deficiencies,
lack of anonymity of research participants, inaccurate reporting of findings, and design
problems); Wardle, supra note 152, at 846-51 (discussing the deficiencies in same-sex
parenting studies which include small sample size, convenience samples, inadequate
control groups, lack of control for extraneous variables, researcher bias, and improper
analysis); see Affidavit of Steven Lowell Nock at 39, Halpern, 2002 Can. LII 42749 (finding
that the only conclusion to be drawn from existing studies is that further research is
necessary because of the studies reviewed "[n]ot a single one was conducted according to
generally accepted standards of scientific research").
185. Wardle, supra note 152, at 852-57; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism
and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 665 (2004)
("[l]t is in the best interests of every child to have a mother and a father who are married
to each other."). Wardle argues that heterosexual parenting is best "because there are
gender-linked differences in child-rearing skills," Wardle, supra note 152, at 857, and "just
as a mother's influence is crucial to the secure, healthy, and full development of a child,
'[a] paternal presence in the life of a child is essential to the child emotionally and
physically,"' id. at 860 (alteration in original) (quoting Kyle D. Pruett, The Paternal
Presence, 74 FAMILIES SOC'Y 46, 46 (1993)). But see Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 183, at
177. Stacey and Biblarz agree that there are differences between children reared by
homosexual parents compared to heterosexual parents, but contend that "[they] cannot be
considered deficits from any legitimate public policy perspective [and that] [t]hey either
favor the children with lesbigay parents, are secondary effects of social prejudice, or
represent 'just a difference' of the sort democratic societies should respect and protect."
Id.
186. Gill, supra note 98, at 392-93; see also Susan Dominus, Growing Up with Mom
and Mom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 24, 2004, at 68, 144 (describing one daughter's
favorable view of growing up with two mothers saying she "wouldn't trade it for
anything").
187. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children's
Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 820-22 (1999);
Bell, supra note 98, at 254 ("Award or denial of visitation often amounts to little more
than a good faith guess, based on a judge's personal experience and preference, about
what ... serves the best interests of the child.").
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rights.18 8 Janet has lived with Isabella since she was born in April of 2002,
Isabella views Janet as a mother, and Janet has played a significant role
in her upbringing.' 89 The relationship of the alleged parent and child and
his or her parenting ability are factors that courts traditionally give
significant weight when applying the best interest standard.9 Provided
the court views Janet's continuation in Isabella's life as being in Isabella's
best interest, Janet should receive visitation rights. 9'
4. Intended Parent Doctrine
Application of the intended parent doctrine, frequently used in
surrogacy and artificial insemination cases, would be applicable to same-
sex couples like Lisa and Janet.9 2  Under this standard, courts award
custody and visitation rights to the individual(s) who intended to bring
the child into existence.'93 In the Miller-Jenkins case, the couple mutually
decided to have a child, agreed that Lisa would carry the child, picked
out the sperm donor together, and together, reared the child until
separation. '94 Therefore, under this doctrine, Lisa would likely be
granted legal and physical custody of Isabella because of her status as the
biological mother, but Janet would receive visitation rights because, if it
were not for Janet's involvement and intention to raise Isabella, Isabella• 195
may never have been conceived. However, the doctrine is not
applicable to disputes involving an adopted child because of preexisting
adoption laws and because the intent of the couple is not dispositive in
those situations. 96
188. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
189. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam.
Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion); Kalita, supra note 14. Isabella refers
to Lisa as "Mommy" and Janet as "Mama." Kalita, supra note 14; see also Miller-Jenkins,
supra note 130. Janet claims that she paid for three rounds of artificial insemination
before Isabella was conceived and was the primary caregiver to Isabella in the early
months after her birth. Miller-Jenkins, supra note 130. Janet has also contributed
financially to Isabella's care. See id.
190. See supra text accompanying note 101.
191. See supra note 189-90 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying note 117-18.
193. See Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 144 45 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004), depublished and review granted, 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004).
194. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County
Fam. Ct. September 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion); see also Bergman, supra
note 130; Miller-Jenkins, supra note 130.
195. See Kristine Renee H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 144-46.
196. See id. at 145-46. In adoption cases, the child at issue is already born so the
rationale that the child would not have come into existence but for the actions of the
couple is not dispositive. Cf. id. In addition, states have adoption laws and policies, which
would presumptively govern. See Christensen, Simulacrum of Marriage, supra note 28, at
1763-64.
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5. Statutory Construction
States could also rely solely on statutory construction and grant
standing to a non-adoptive, non-biological partner only if his or her
relationship to the child fits within a statute authorizing him or her to
seek custody or visitation. 197  However, most state statutes are very
narrowly drawn and do not contemplate a same-sex partner seeking
custody or visitation, automatically precluding a same-sex partner from
seeking any rights to the child.99  Applying this option to the Miller-
Jenkins case, Janet, as the non-biological, non-adoptive partner, would
be excluded from asserting any rights to custody of or visitation with
Isabella.199
IV. MODIFIED BEST INTEREST STANDARD
2
00
As the above analysis illustrates, the problem with the current
standards is that none effectively account for the interests of all the
parties. 0' Of these standards, the best interest of the child standard is the
most appropriate because it is the only one to truly consider the child.
However, the biological or adoptive parents' rights must also be
protected, and, for this reason, the partner seeking custody or visitation
should be required to show that he or she is a psychological parent whose
203relationship warrants protection. Mandating application of the
psychological parent doctrine would protect the biological or adoptive
parent from frivolous litigation by an individual who has no significant
connection with the child while at the same time keeping the best interest
of the child paramount 20
The four-part test developed in Wisconsin is the most appropriate
method to apply the psychological parent doctrine. Special attention
197. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per
curium); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 918 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
199. See supra Part Il.B.2(a).
200. This Comment restricts the argument for use of the modified best interest of the
child standard to custody and visitation disputes between same-sex couples. Use of the
standard in all other third-party child custody and visitation disputes is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
201. See supra Part III.B.
202. See supra Part III.B.3.
203. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 72-73 (2000) (plurality opinion); In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995); see also supra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text.
204. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 560 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, No.
04SC528, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 851 (Colo. Oct. 25, 2004).
205. See E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560; H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421; supra note 106 and
accompanying text. The Rhode Island Supreme Court claims that the four-part test will
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should be given to the first factor, the intent of the biological parent in
permitting and fostering a relationship with the child.2° When a child is
brought into a family, there is a significant amount "of planning[,] time,
effort, emotion, and money expended. 2 °7  Because the non-biological,
non-adoptive partner expects significant involvement in rearing the child
and has relied on that expectation, the intent of the biological or
adoptive parent in permitting and fostering this arrangement deserves
significant weight.2°8 In particular, a court should draw from California's
intended parent doctrine factors and focus on the biological or adoptive
parent's intent prior to the child's birth and during the rearing of the
child.'09 Paying special attention to the conduct of the biological or
adoptive parent prior to separation will prevent the parent from denying
a claim of custody or visitation by his or her same-sex partner based
solely on the fact that he or she regrets letting the partner into the child's
life.210 Denying custody or visitation to the same-sex partner because of
such a claim would violate the child's best interest because those
"interests are not likely to run contrary to those of adults who choose to
211
bring [a child] into being" and take active roles in rearing the child .
Although the best interest of the child standard is amorphous, the
four-part test provides judges with specific criteria upon which to base a
judgment and lessens the probability that his or her feelings will dictate
strictly limit the adults who will be deemed psychological parents of the child and will
protect the legal parent from potential claims by such individuals as "neighbors,
caretakers, baby sitters, nannies, au pairs, nonparental relatives, and family friends."
Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000). Additionally, a New Jersey court has
added that "a relationship based on payment by the legal parent to the third party will not
qualify." V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539,552 (N.J. 2000), affd, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
206. See Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann. R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 145-46 (Ct. App.
2004), depublished and review granted, 97 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2004); V.C., 748 A.2d at 552;
H.S.t1.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 437.
207. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 324.
208. See id.
209. Kristine Renee H., 16 Cal. Rptr. at 145; see supra Part II.B.1(b).
210. See E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560; see also, Rubano, 759 A.2d at 976.
A Colorado court states:
The first factor contains an estoppel-like element and recognizes that, where a
legal parent has fostered a parent-like relationship between her child and a
nonparent, "the right of the legal parent '[does] not extend to erasing a
relationship between her partner and her child which she voluntarily created and
actively fostered simply because after the party's ... separation she regretted
having done so."'
E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 560 (quoting V.C., 748 A.2d at 552 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682
A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. 1996))).
211. Shultz, supra note 207, at 397.
2005] 1269
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1235
the outcome.2" The four-part test also allows judges leeway to decide
these disputes.23 These cases must be evaluated on an individual basis
because their outcomes will have a substantial impact on the child's
future; therefore, judges need flexibility to determine the best interest of
the child.214 Other commentators have advocated similar standards, but
this proposal is different because of its inclusion of the psychological
parent doctrine as a mandatory element of the best interest standard,
promotion of Wisconsin's four-part test, and special emphasis on the
intent factor.
215
Applying the four-part test to the Miller-Jenkins case, Janet is a
psychological parent to Isabella and should be allowed to continue a
parent-child relationship with her.1 6 First, Lisa, the biological and legal
217parent, consented to and fostered Janet's relationship with Isabella.
Lisa did not prevent Janet from forming a relationship with Isabella and,
218at first, permitted visitation even after she and Janet separated.
Second, Janet and Isabella lived in the same household. 219 Neither party
denies that Janet, Lisa, and Isabella lived as a family.220 Third, Janet, the
nonparent, assumed significant responsibilities in the care and upbringing
of Isabella.221 Janet contributed to the expenses and took an active role
212. See Bell, supra note 98, at 254; supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
213. See Susan Tomaine, Comment, Troxel v. Granville: Protecting Fundamental
Parental Rights While Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.
731, 780 (2001) (arguing that "an open standing provision grants courts flexibility to
provide a remedy to a nonparent [third party]").
214. See id.
215. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood As an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REV. 879, 946-48 (1984) (advocating the psychological parent doctrine and focusing
on the factors of physical custody of the child, mutuality, and consent, but not focusing on
requiring an assumption of significant responsibilities to the child); Bell, supra note 98, at
275-76 (recommending psychosocial parent visitation statutes contain a clear and
convincing evidence standard and focusing on the factors of living with the child, financial
support, and a parent-child bond, but not on the intent of the biological or adoptive parent
in fostering the relationship); Osborne, supra note 5, at 385, 392 (arguing for use of the
psychological parent doctrine in relation to standing only); Silverthorn, supra note 21, at
924-25 (advocating the psychological parent doctrine only as it relates to standing and not
as being encompassed in the best interest of the child standard).
216. See In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,421 (Wis. 1995).
217. See id.
218. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam.
Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion).
219. See H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
220. Miller-Jenkins v, Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam.
Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion).
221. SeeH.S.H.-K.,533N.W.2dat421.
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in caring for Isabella. 2  Fourth, Janet, the nonparent, established a
dependent relationship with Isabella.223 Isabella bonded with Janet,
having lived with her since she was born, and knew her as "Mama. ' 24
Application of all four factors demonstrates that Janet is a psychological
parent to Isabella and it would be in Isabella's best interest to maintain
221the relationship through at least visitation
The proposed modified best interest standard does not change current
law, only its application. 26 Family law has evolved in the past to reflect
227changing family dynamics. For example, as women became more
involved in the workforce and men more involved in childcare, upon
divorce, joint custody was more often seen as in the child's best
interest.22' Today, an increasing number of same-sex couples are having
families together; the application of the best interest standard ought to
reflect this change." 9 Making application of the psychological parent
doctrine a mandatory element will achieve this goal and continue the
emerging trend of the Supreme Court and many states of being more
open to allowing third parties to seek child custody and visitation.
V. CONCLUSION
Many same-sex couples are entering into unions and having children
together. However, while a few states sanction same-sex unions, the
majority of states have passed laws prohibiting them. A problem arises
when the union dissolves and custody or visitation is sought in a state
that does not recognize same-sex unions. Courts and commentators have
not reached a consensus on the appropriate method to adjudicate these
cases. A uniform standard is needed to prevent forum shopping and
reduce the inconsistency found in past decisions. The standard that
222. See Miller-Jenkins, supra note 130. Janet has paid child support and has provided
Lisa with other necessities to aid her in caring for Isabella. Id.
223. See H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
224. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 Rddm (Vt. Rutland County Fam.
Ct. Sept. 2, 2004) (order granting contempt motion); see also Miller-Jenkins, supra note
130.
225. See H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421;supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.A. The best interest standard is still being used and being a
psychological parent is a common factor in a best interest analysis. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. The only difference is that by making the psychological parent
doctrine mandatory, the application of the best interest standard therefore changes. See
supra notes 188-211 and accompanying text.
227. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 57, at 8.
228. Jo-Ellen Paradise, Note, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody
Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer To Everyone's Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
517, 529 (1998).
229. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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should be applied is a modified best interest of the child standard with a
mandatory psychological parent determination. This standard protects
all parties while giving special attention to the child, who has the most to
lose.
